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marginal revenues with Nash conjectures are equal to or less than its marginal 
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This paper proposes a novel collusion test based on the analysis of incentives faced by each 
firm in a colluding coalition. In fact, once collusion is in effect, each colluding firm faces the 
incentive to secretly deviate from the agreement, since it thereby increases its profits, 
although the colluding firms’ joint profit decreases. Thus, in a colluding coalition each firm has 
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1. Introduction 
The variety and audacity of secret industry cartels does not cease to surprise. Cartels 
are found in many industries and regions such as the international vitamin makers, the US 
electric turbine manufacturers, the German cement makers, the French mobile 
telecommunications operators, just to cite a few.1 Despite the threat of large fines if the 
cartels are detected, recent cases attest to collusion’s enduring appeal: US Department of 
Justice antitrust investigations into alleged price fixing practices at the world’s leading flat 
panel display makers and of the $2 trillion municipal bond market, and investigations by the 
German cartel office and the European Commission into the German and European 
electricity markets. Importantly, a large number of cartels are discovered only through 
denunciation by one of the cartel members, which suggests regulators, when unable to 
observe conduct, do not seem able to determine misconduct by analysis of structure or 
performance to a standard of certainty that will stand the scrutiny of the courts.  
A large body of research has proposed different tests of conduct consistent with 
collusive behavior (Feuerstein, 2005; Harrington, 2005; Porter, 2005). It is generally accepted 
that collusive conduct cannot alone be inferred from market performance indicators such as 
high profitability, high price-cost margins, or high prices (Demsetz, 1973; Scherer and Ross, 
1990; Harrington, 2005).2 The structuralist hypothesis that market structure is, per se, the 
fundamental explanation for firm conduct is unsatisfactory since it implies the linkage is 
mechanical, and since it fails to consider the potential for reverse causality (Cabral, 2000), 
the contestable markets hypothesis (Baumol et al, 1982), and to reflect the dynamic nature of 
oligopolistic competition. Approaches that seek to model firm conduct explicitly (Bresnahan, 
                                            
1
 Handelsblatt, Apr. 14, 2003, “Zement-Bußgelder über 660 Millionen Euro verhängt”; Financial 
Times, Adam Jones, Dec. 1, 2005, “French top mobile groups fined”; Financial Times, Song Jung-a, 
Dec. 12, 2006, “Samsung, LG Philips and Sharp hit by probe”; and Bloomberg, William Selway and 
Martin Braun, Dec. 7, 2006, “U.S. Criminal Probe Rattles $2 Trillion Municipal Bond Market”. 
2
 There are apparently plenty of other conducts available to firms to restrict competition which 
do not necessarily translate in increases in prices or reductions in output relative to the initial 
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1989; Parker and Röller, 1997) require a degree of rationality, information, and foresight that 
may not be consistent with reality, make strong assumptions about demand and cost 
functions, and face significant estimation difficulties. See Corts (1999) for an excellent 
overview of the problems with such models.  Finally, dynamic models of strategic interaction 
(Harrington, 2005), by emphasizing the possibility of retaliatory behavior due to repeated 
interaction, offer the possibility of inferring variations in firm conduct over time. However, firm 
conduct may not be time-consistent nor always consistent with rational behavior in the 
context of a strategic game. In addition, such models assume some degree of market 
stability over time, which means they offer unsatisfactory predictions in markets where 
demand fluctuates strongly or markets that face rapid technological change (Harrington, 
2005).  
Prior work developed models of firm conduct that focused on the difference between 
prices and marginal costs as the measure of market performance (Stigler, 1964; Cowling and 
Waterson, 1976; Bresnahan, 1981; Kamien and Schwartz, 1983; Hall, 1988; Parker and 
Röller, 1997).  
This paper proposes a novel collusion test that sidesteps measures of market 
performance and instead focuses on the incentives firms face in an imperfectly competitive 
setting. Economic incentives affect agents’ conduct and performance, including in aspects as 
important as life and death. Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999) show how US Federal 
personal income tax incentives contribute to the anticipation of child births from January to 
December, and Gans and Leigh (2006) show how 1979 inheritance tax changes in Australia 
contributed to the delay of the death of 50 individuals by a week, equivalent to more than half 
of the individuals who would be subject to the inheritance tax. Therefore, it is only logical to 
seek to detect collusion by looking at the incentives individual firms face rather than by 
attempting to measure, after-the-fact, the effect of collusion on market performance 
variables. This is the rationale for the tests proposed in this paper. 
                                                                                                                                         
equilibrium. For example, prestigious firms such as Intel or Microsoft have in the past successfully 
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The main characteristic of a collusive outcome is that it is inherently unstable since it 
is not a perfect Nash equilibrium and each firm has an incentive to deviate from the agreed 
output or price (Stigler, 1964; Cabral, 2000).3 That is, for every possible tacit or explicit 
collusive agreement, each colluding firm’s marginal revenue (with Nash conjectures) is larger 
than its marginal cost, since each firm is not maximizing its individual profit for the benefit of 
the colluding coalition joint profits. Under competition a la Cournot each firm in the colluding 
coalition has an incentive to increase output in order to increase its profits. Likewise, under 
competition a la Bertrand, each firm in the colluding coalition has an incentive to lower prices 
below agreed level so as to increase its profits. Further, the incentive to secretly deviate from 
the collusive agreement is larger the larger the price-cost margins are (Stigler, 1964; 
Harrington, 2005; Porter, 2005). In fact, the paper shows that a test of collusive conduct can 
be accomplished by comparing firm marginal revenues (with Nash conjectures) with its 
marginal costs, rejecting the hypothesis of no collusion if firm marginal revenues are 
statistically significantly larger than its marginal costs. 
To derive the theorems and proofs, I use the standard imperfect competitive market 
assumptions, weak-concave and downward sloping demand, linear costs, and Nash 
conjectures. I deviate from standard oligopoly theory only in that I offer a more precise 
definition of industry market power, and this definition is not necessary for deriving the 
results. It can be dropped without affecting the proofs.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the duality of the Cournot 
and Bertrand models, to motivate the utilization of Nash conjectures in detecting collusive 
behavior, and as a basis for the future extension of the theorems and proofs to the Bertrand 
model. Using a Cournot competition model, Section 3 derives the theorems and proofs that 
                                                                                                                                         
threatened suppliers or clients of a competitor, to the detriment of the competitor’s business. 
3
 In the late 1990s the Economist pointed out that the cheating that the OPEC cartel countries 
did on their allocated production quotas were the cause for the low oil prices, although there was a 
modicum of collusion (the International Energy Agency estimated a compliance of 75%). According to 
the Economist, quoting Vahan Zanoyan of the Washington-based Petroleum Finance Company, “When 
prices are strong, the temptation to be the first cheat is impossible to resist” (see “Lying low”, The 
Economist, July 2nd 1998; see also “Still kicking?”, The Economist, March 25th 1999”). 
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show that a test of collusion can be equated with a test of the profit maximization condition 
with Nash conjectures. Section 4 specifies the one-tailed test hypothesis consistent with the 
theorems established in Section 3. Section 5 identifies issues for further research. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Cournot and Bertrand Duality and importance of Nash conjectures 
 As is well known, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly models differ in what is thought to 
be the decision variable of the firm, quantity and price, respectively. As a consequence, 
Cournot and Bertrand equilibria offer radically different predictions for the outcomes of 
imperfectly competitive markets. If the number of firms is larger than one, Cournot 
competition is always more “monopolistic” than Bertrand competition, and the latter always 
achieves equilibria where prices equal marginal costs (Singh and Vives, 1984). A large body 
of literature has sought reconcile the predictions of these models. This is accomplished 
through, for example, the introduction of product differentiation, capacity constraints, or a 
temporal dimension in the Bertrand model, or consistent conjectural variations and barriers to 
entry in the Cournot model.  
Less well emphasized is the fact that, apart from the decision variable, both model 
frameworks are identical.  Both are based on an identical set of beliefs about other firms 
reactions, assumed not to change when the firm changes its own decision variable, an 
assumption which I designate here by Nash conjectures but Kamien and Schwartz (1983) 
designate by zero conjectural variations. As a result of the assumption of Nash conjectures, 
Cournot and Bertrand equilibria are perfect commitment Nash equilibria, as no firm has the 
incentive to unilaterally change its decision variable (Singh and Vives, 1984; Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1986). Arising from this set of beliefs, Grossman (1981) argues that under Bertrand 
firms cannot make binding price contracts, while under Cournot, output contracts are always 
binding. Furthermore, under linear demand and costs, Cournot and Bertrand substitute and 
complementary goods equilibria have been shown to be dual (Singh and Vives, 1984).  
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 Prior literature (Chamberlin, 1933; Grossman, 1981; Bresnahan, 1981; Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1983) has criticized Cournot Nash conjectures as a not appropriate model of firm 
conduct. Among the arguments offered, contrary to the assumptions underlying Cournot 
Nash conjectures, other firms do react to changes in the firm’s output decisions; beliefs 
underlying Cournot Nash conjectures are logically inconsistent, as firms react to changes in 
other firms’ outputs while assuming that its rivals do not do so; Cournot Nash conjectures are 
inconsistent with tacit collusion (Chamberlin, 1933); it is argued that price, not output, is the 
relevant strategic variable in imperfectly competitive markets with homogeneous goods; and, 
finally, empirical evidence for a variety of industry is inconsistent with Cournot Nash 
conjectures (Kamien and Schwartz, 1983). Many other authors have also pointed out that the 
non-cooperative one-shot game reflects reality poorly. These criticisms have been often 
misinterpreted as criticisms of the Cournot Nash equilibrium, rather than of the set of beliefs, 
i.e., the underlying Cournot Nash conjectures. Moreover, as was seen above, most of the 
above arguments apply also to Bertrand Nash conjectures.  
Nonetheless, there is a strong case for using Cournot and Bertrand Nash conjectures 
for solving the firm profit maximization problem (Daughety, 1985; Corts, 1999). Foremost, the 
power of this set of beliefs in describing firm interactions in one-shot “prisoner dilemma” type 
games or when output and price decisions by firms are not perfectly observable by 
competitors. In addition, Nash conjectures ensure that the Cournot and Bertrand Nash 
equilibria are perfect commitment equilibria (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986). If other firms, for 
some reason such as irrationality or imperfect information, deviate from their optimal 
response, a profit maximizing firm can use Nash conjectures to derive the optimal off-path 
equilibrium response, which results in the so-called reaction function.  
Finally, this paper argues that Nash conjectures are particularly appropriate for 
inferring tacit and explicit collusive behavior. Given that collusion is taking place, if a colluding 
firm violates the collusive agreement, it does so since it assumes that its rivals cannot react 
or since it assumes its rivals will not react, for example, because the rivals do not observe 
that the firm is violating the collusive agreement. Alternatively, even if output decisions are 
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observable by rivals and the colluding coalition truly enforces discipline in the case of 
violations to the collusive agreement by a firm, the unconstrained incentive to deviate that 
each firm faces is still calculated as if the rivals could not observe and react to the firm’s 
output changes, i.e., as if each colluding firm were operating under Nash conjectures. Thus, 
Cournot and Bertrand Nash conjectures, even if not representative of actual firm practice 
(Kamien and Schwartz, 1983), provide an important reference point as to the optimal self-
interested and non-cooperative conduct of firms, if left to their own devices. 
 
DEFINITION 1. In an imperfectly competitive industry, define “industry market power” as the 
extent to which market price (output) exceeds (falls short of) the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium price (output)4, where maximum market power is consistent with monopoly profit 
maximization, and minimum market power is consistent with non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium. 
Market power is traditionally defined as the extent to which prices differ from marginal 
costs, for example through measures such as the Lerner index (Motta, 2004; Scherer and 
Ross, 1990; Tirole, 1988). Under competition a la Bertrand, Definition 1 coincides with the 
traditional literature definition, as Nash equilibrium is such that price equals marginal cost. 
However, under competition a la Cournot, Nash equilibrium price is larger than marginal cost, 
and output is smaller than perfect competition output (Singh and Vives, 1984). In offering this 
alternative definition, I build on prior empirical work that indirectly estimate the degree of 
collusion by the extent observed price-cost margins differ from those under the Cournot Nash 
equilibrium (Parker and Röller, 1997). See also Corts (1999) for an overview of similar 
approaches in the empirical literature. 
The motivation for introducing a novel definition of market power is that the reference 
perfect Nash equilibrium consistent with “optimal” oligopoly performance will differ depending 
                                            
4
 The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium differs depending on whether competition is a la 
Cournot or a la Bertrand.  
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on what is considered as the correct strategic variable and underlying model (Cournot or 
Bertrand). Furthermore, with Definition 1, the measure of industry of market power compares 
the same decision variable, industry output with non-cooperative Nash equilibrium output, 
and market price with non-cooperative Nash equilibrium price, consistent with the strategic 
variable of the underlying Cournot or Bertrand model, rather than always compare price with 
marginal cost. Finally, given the dual way in which market power is defined, it is always 
possible to measure industry market power, even when firm costs are asymmetric. 
 
DEFINITION 2. Collusion occurs when firms cooperate (explicitly or tacitly) to increase industry 
market power relative to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
Under this definition, collusion also comprehends the cases where tacit cooperation 
occurs, although tacit collusion is not unlawful in most countries. Hereafter, I focus on the 
Cournot model with n firms in equilibrium.  
3. Model and Theorems 
Using a Cournot competition model, assume homogenous output and an oligopolistic 
industry structure with n firms in equilibrium, each with constant and identical marginal costs, 
then:  
 ∑∑ ∑∑
== ==
−⋅=−==
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where piT are the industry’s total profits, pii are firm i’s profits, qi is firm i’s output, QT is total 
industry output, p(QT) is market demand function, and CTi is firm i’s total cost of production of 
output qi. The industry’s total costs, CTT is given by:  
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where Q
-i is the sum of the outputs of all other firms in the industry,
i
i
dq
dQ
−
=γ  is the 
conjectural variation which reflects the expectation of firm i about how other firms react in 
terms of their (joint) output level, Q
-i, to a change in firm i’s output, qi.  
In a non-cooperative equilibrium each firm chooses output to maximize its own profits 
given other firms optimal output decisions and has Cournot Nash conjectures (
i
i
dq
dQ
−
=γ =0), 
i.e., assumes absence of reaction by other firms. Thus, expression (3) reduces to the 
Cournot equilibrium: 
mcmr oi =       ( 4 ) 
where oimr , 0iq  and 0TQ  are the firm marginal revenues, firm output, and the industry output 
in a Cournot equilibrium, respectively.  
Hereafter, following the arguments presented in Section 2, I distinguish between the 
firm marginal revenue calculated with Nash conjectures, imr , and firm marginal revenue at 
the Cournot Nash equilibrium, oimr . imr  coincides with (4) at the Cournot Nash equilibrium, 
but differs from (4) for all other possible oligopoly outcomes.  
 
ASSUMPTION 1. For any QT>0 such that p(QT)>0, assume that: 
(i) Demand is downward sloping, p’(QT)<0 
(ii) Demand is weakly concave, 0)´´( ≤TQp  
It follows from Assumption 1 that the industry profit function is strictly concave, i.e.,  
   0)´(2)´´()(´´ <⋅+⋅= TTTTT QpQQpQpi     ( 5 ) 
and that firm i’s profit function with Cournot Nash conjectures, 
i
i
dq
dQ
−
=γ =0, is also strictly 
concave: 
   niQpqQpq TiTii ,...,1,0)´(2)´´()(´´ ∈∀<⋅+⋅=pi    ( 6 ) 
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 Industry profits under collusion are given by: 
     ∑
=
=
n
i
iiTT qQ
1
** )()( pipi      ( 7 ) 
where maximum industry profits under collusion are always equal to or less than monopoly 
profits, and firm and industry outcomes under collusion are hereafter identified with an 
asterisk superscript. Thus, the following condition can be additionally imposed: 
 
ASSUMPTION 2. For any collusive outcome with industry output *TQ >0, assume that: 
      0)( *´ ≤TT Qpi      ( 8 ) 
Since, from Assumption 1, industry profits are strictly concave, Assumption 2 implies that, 
under collusion, industry output is equal to or larger than monopoly output, since it would be 
sub-optimal for the colluding coalition to reduce output below monopoly output levels, where 
joint industry profitability is increasing in output.  
 
LEMMA 1. A profit maximizing firm colludes if collusion is a profit enhancing activity. 
Proof. I want to show that (i) collusive behavior by a firm implies an increase in the firm 
profits relative to the ex-ante case where the firm does not collude. The transpose is that (ii) if 
collusion results in profits that are equal to or smaller than the non-collusive case, then the 
firm does not collude. 
(i) Proof by transposition and reduction ad absurdum. Suppose that the firm colludes 
and that profits under collusion are equal to or smaller than the ex-ante non-cooperative 
profits. Consider first the case of explicit collusion. It is costly to explicitly coordinate actions 
with other firms rather than act independently. Moreover, there is a, however small, risk of 
punishment by authorities in the case of discovery of explicit coordination, which has a 
negative impact on expected profits. In addition, there is also the risk of secret violations of 
the collusive agreement by competitors, also with a negative impact on expected profits. 
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Therefore, the firm could reduce costs and increase expected profits by not engaging in 
explicit collusion, ceteris paribus.  
A similar reasoning can be applied to the case of tacit coordination. Although tacit 
coordination is not subject to punishment with negative expected impact on profits, there are 
no a priori reasons why tacit coordination should be preferred to no coordination, unless 
there are some incentives to do so. Tacit coordination requires at least as much firm effort 
and resources as non-cooperative profit maximization. Thus, tacit coordination is not less 
costly than non-cooperative profit maximization. Moreover, there is also the risk of cheating 
by competitors with a negative impact on expected profits. Therefore, the firm could increase 
profits by not engaging in tacit collusion. 
Since the firm is profit maximizing, if collusion is not a profitable activity then it follows 
that the firm will not collude, contradicting our initial hypothesis.  
Q.E.D. 
Note that if collusion is in effect prior to the participation of the firm, there would not 
be an incentive for the firm to join in the collusion effort ex-post, as the ex-ante non-colluding 
firm profits would be larger than under collusion. Alternatively, the colluding coalition might 
engage in punishing behavior to induce the non-colluding firm to join in. 
 
AXIOM 1. Collusion is profitable if and only if all low-cost firms collude and if low-cost firms 
have a sufficiently large combined share of the market.  
A formal proof of this Axiom falls outside the scope of this paper, and therefore it is 
offered here as an Axiom rather than as a Theorem. The explanation of the Axiom is laid out 
below, which builds on merger literature and on an example.  
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Obviously, more than one firm must collude in order for collusion to be profitable.5 
The issue is whether it is possible to characterize the minimum colluding coalition size 
required in order for collusion to be profitable. Since there is a continuum of possible 
colluding outcomes, it is not possible to determine the minimum colluding coalition size. 
However, since perfect collusion achieves, at best, a performance (i.e., profits) identical to 
that achieved through the merger of the firms, the minimum profitable merger size is the 
lower bound for the minimal coalition size. Thus, it is useful to build on the horizontal merger 
literature that seeks to determine the conditions under which mergers among firms are 
profitable (Salant et al, 1983; Perry and Porter, 1985; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990; Cheung, 
1992; Faulí-Oller, 1997, 2002).   
Salant et al (1983) seminal paper showed that following a merger among symmetric 
firms with linear costs and homogeneous goods, the parties to the merger (insiders) would 
have the incentive to reduce output, whereas the parties external to the merger would 
increase output. Moreover, industry output would decrease and price would increase. 
Building on this result, Cheung (1992) shows that the mergers are always unprofitable if they 
involve less than 50% of the firms in the industry, but may be profitable if they involve more 
than that percentage of firms, using strictly concave industry profit function such as that 
defined in equation (5) of this paper. Faulí-Oller (1997) generalizes the model to show that 
the minimal market share required to ensure that the merger is profitable is increasing in the 
degree of concavity of demand and in the ex-ante number of firms in the industry.  
Thus, the horizontal merger literature indicates that the condition for successful 
collusion is that the number of firms in the industry is not too large, and that a large 
percentage of firms participate in the collusive agreement, i.e., collusion would be quite 
difficult to achieve for a symmetric oligopoly. This result is somewhat paradoxical as it 
                                            
5
 If only firm i colludes, it follows that firm i profits under collusion are lower than its profits 
under Cournot equilibrium since firm i’s profit function is strictly concave and, per definition, the Cournot 
equilibrium level is profit maximizing for firm i, given all other firms optimal responses. Thus, firm i could 
increase profits by not engaging in collusion, thus violating Lemma 1. 
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suggests that both mergers but also tacit and explicit collusion would tend to occur very 
scarcely, a result contrary to the anecdotal and empirical evidence available. 
Three main approaches suggest ways in which there can be profitable mergers with 
smaller subsets of firms, namely cost convexity (Perry and Porter, 1985), Stackelberg 
leadership (Daughety, 1990), and cost asymmetry (Faulí-Oller, 2002). Still, Heywood and 
McGinty (2007) point out that there is a second merger paradox since, even when the merger 
is profitable, firms quite often face an incentive not to merge, as firms that do not merge often 
gain more from the merger than the firms that merge. A similar principle applies to collusion, 
why collude if the firm can “free-ride” and benefit from the collusive efforts of others, without 
incurring the costs and risks associated with collusive behavior.  
Cost asymmetries provide the best line of explanation for these paradoxes. Faulí-Oller 
(2002) shows that a merger between a low- and a high-cost firm can be profitable, as the 
merged firm switches production to its low cost facilities.6 This result is not, in itself, helpful 
for collusion analysis since, under collusion, it is not feasible to switch production among 
firms if there are no side-payments. Instead, anecdotal evidence of explicit collusion cases 
suggests that colluding coalitions nearly always involve all the large firms in a market, i.e., the 
firms with large market share. In a Cournot setting, firms with large market shares have low 
marginal costs. Thus, collusion will only be profitable if a sufficiently large coalition of firms 
with low marginal costs, and as a result, a high combined share of the market, participate in 
the collusive effort.  
As an example consider the case with linear demand given by 
    QBAQP *)( −=       ( 9 ) 
 
                                            
6
 Faulí-Oller (2002, p.83) incorrectly argues that merger among large firms is always not 
profitable. This is probably a poorly worded statement, given that his own prior work (1997) 
characterized conditions under which mergers could be profitable even without cost efficiency effects. 
Nonetheless, both of his contributions to merger theory have not yet, in my view, gained their well 
deserved recognition.  
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and asymmetric linear costs, mcLow and mcHigh. Assume there are nLow firms with low marginal 
costs, and nHigh firms with high marginal costs. Then, it can be shown that the Cournot Nash 
equilibrium is given by: 
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where Highq  and Lowq  are the output of the high- and low-cost firms, respectively. If the cost 
asymmetries are sufficiently large, then the low cost firms can have a combined very large 
market share of the market, and it can be profitable for them to collude even if the high cost 
fringe firms do not collude. As a result of collusion among large firms, their combined market 
share falls significantly, while the market share and profits of the fringe (high cost) firms rise 
substantially. However, if a low cost firm does not collude, then it is not profitable for the 
remaining low cost firms to collude, a result similar to that predicted by Salant et al (1983), 
regardless of whether or not the high cost firm colludes. Thus, collusion must involve all large 
(low cost) firms. 
For example, if the above model is solved with the following parameter values: mcLow 
= 2, mcHigh =20, nLow = 5, and nHigh =1, A=200, B=1, then the combined market share of the 
large firms under the Cournot Nash equilibrium is 92%. Each large (low cost) firm market 
share is 16.4% and the fringe (high cost) firm has a 7.6% market share. If all 5 low cost firms 
collude perfectly, then it is profitable to collude, but combined market share of colluding firms 
falls to 57%. However, if one of the large firms does not collude, then collusion is no longer 
profitable as the combined market share of colluding firms falls to 37.5%. 
This Axiom addresses both merger paradoxes and is consistent with the prior 
literature. Collusion is profitable if all large firms participate, therefore there is an incentive for 
large firms to participate. On the other hand, no large (low-cost) firm can free-ride on the 
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collusive agreement, since it suffices that there is a large free-rider firm to destroy any 
collusive effort. If a large firm free-rides on the collusive effort, by maximizing profits under 
Cournot Nash conjectures, it makes the collusive effort unprofitable for the colluding firms, 
and therefore the other large firms would have no incentive to collude.  Collusion is an all or 
none proposition for large firms.  
Finally, Axiom 1 suggests a key difference between the collusion and merger 
literature. Collusive effort aims at involving a large combined market share of the firms in the 
market. On the other hand, as partly argued by Faulí-Oller (2002), merger effort aims at 
achieving cost efficiencies, and thus only occurs between large (low-cost) and small (high-
cost) firms. This happens because only mergers that aim for cost efficiencies are both 
profitable and feasible in the current regulatory environment. Mergers between two large 
firms are not profitable since, typically, they do not achieve the minimum market share 
threshold necessary to ensure that the merger is profitable a la Salant et al (1983).  Mergers 
between all large firms, while profitable, are not socially accepted nor feasible in the current 
regulatory context. 
           
THEOREM 1. Collusion occurs if and only if industry profits are above the level of the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. The proof is again for competition a la Cournot. I want to show that (i) collusion 
implies that industry profits are above the non-cooperative Cournot equilibrium level; and (ii) 
the finding of equilibria with industry profits above Cournot equilibrium levels implies that 
there is collusion.  
(i) Proof by reductio ad absurdum. From Axiom 1, assume that at least two firms 
collude by deviating from the Cournot equilibrium output level (represented with the 
superscript “0”) and that industry profits in the new equilibrium (superscript “*”) are less than 
or equal to the non-cooperative equilibrium level. From Lemma 1, it follows that a profit 
maximizing firm colludes because collusion is a profit enhancing activity. Then, 
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   )()()()(,...,1, 0*0* jjjjiiii qqqqnji pipipipi >∧>∈∃    ( 12 ) 
that is, at least two firms have profits higher than the non-cooperative level. From this result 
and the initial hypothesis that industry profits are less than or equal to non-cooperative 
Cournot profits, it follows that the sum of all other n-2 firm profits must be lower than their 
Cournot equilibrium level, and if so then 
    )()(,...,1, 0* kkkk qqnjik pipi <∈≠∃     ( 13 ) 
Definition 1 and 2 indicate that collusion implies a decrease in industry output and an 
increase in market price, i.e., 
     )()( 0* TT QpQp >      ( 14 ) 
then from (13) and (14) it follows that 
            
0*
kk qq <       ( 15 ) 
Since from Assumption 1, firm profits are strictly concave, and non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium profits are maximized with: 
    0)()´()( 0000´ =−+⋅= mcQpqQpq TkTkkpi    ( 16 ) 
it follows that 
     0)( *´ >kk qpi       ( 17 ) 
Thus, firm k could increase profits by increasing output, so *kq  is not a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium for firm k. Furthermore, a counter example shows that since: 
           
*0*0
TTkk QQqq −≤−       ( 18 ) 
then firm k could achieve profits higher than the non-cooperative level by increasing output to 
0
kq , contradicting (13) and implying that the industry profits under collusion cannot be equal 
to or less than the non-cooperative Cournot equilibrium level. 
Q.E.D. 
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(ii) Proof by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose there is a sustainable equilibrium 
(identified with the superscript ” e”) where industry profits are above the non-cooperative 
Cournot equilibrium and there is no collusion, i.e., firms in the industry do not cooperate 
explicitly or tacitly. Since from Assumption 1 it follows that the industry profit function is 
strictly concave then *´ ,0)( MTTT QQQ ≥∀≤pi , where *MQ  is optimal monopoly output, and: 
   )()()()( 000 TeTTeTTTeTT QpQpQQQQ >⇒<⇒> pipi    ( 19 ) 
since 0)´( <TQp . Then, either (a) all firms have profits above the non-cooperative level or (b) 
at least one firm has profits below the non-cooperative level. If (a) applies, then the non-
cooperative Cournot equilibrium cannot be a Nash equilibrium because there is another non-
cooperative equilibrium, which improves profits for all firms in the industry; if (b) applies then 
for the firms that have profits below the non-cooperative level it follows that: 
   ( ) ( ) 000 )()()()( iTeieTiieii qmcQpqmcQpqq ⋅−<⋅−⇔< pipi   ( 20 ) 
from (19) it follows that 
     ( ) ( )mcQpmcQp TeT −>− )()( 0     ( 21 ) 
thus, from (20) and (21) for firm i to have profits below the non-cooperative level it must be 
that  
      
0
i
e
i qq <      ( 22 ) 
but then a similar reasoning to part (i) of the proof can be used to show that firm i could 
achieve profits at least as high as the non-cooperative level by increasing output to the 
Cournot equilibrium level, contradicting our initial hypothesis (b). Thus, the outcome with 
higher industry profits would not be a sustainable equilibrium, contrary to our initial 
hypothesis. 
Q.E.D.  
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COROLLARY 1. If industry profits are larger than the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium industry 
profits, then the profits of any subset of the firms in the industry are larger than the profits of 
the same subset of firms under a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. Both colluding and non-colluding firms benefit from collusion. Theorem 1 shows that if 
industry profits are larger than the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium level then there is 
collusion. Lemma 1 shows that firms collude if and only if collusion is profitable. Thus, the 
profits of any subset of colluding firms is larger than the profits of the same subset of 
colluding firms under the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.  
Moreover, Salant et al (1983), Heywood and McGinty (2007), and others show that 
firms external to mergers benefit from a merger, often more so than firms that merge. From 
Assumption 1, it follows that the industry profit function is strictly concave. Assumption 2 
additionally means that higher industry profits can only be achieved through higher price and 
lower output level. As a result, each and every non-colluding profit maximizing firm, 
experiences a shift to the right of its residual demand function, and achieves higher profits 
than under the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Thus, the joint profit of any subset of non-
colluding firms is also larger than the profits of the same subset of firms under the non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
Q.E.D. 
 This result is relevant if it is only possible to obtain firm data for a subset of the 
industry. For example, it maybe the case that it is only possible to obtain data for the largest 
firms in the industry. Axiom 1, Theorem 1, and Corollary 1 indicate that data on the largest 
firms would suffice to investigate whether the industry has or not collusive behavior. 
 
THEOREM 2. Industry profits are above non-cooperative Nash equilibrium levels if and only if 
marginal revenue with Nash conjectures is larger than marginal cost for at least one firm. 
Proof. I want to show that: (i) the existence of industry profits larger than non-cooperative 
level implies that marginal revenues are larger than marginal costs for at least one firm; and 
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(ii) if at least one firm has marginal revenues larger than marginal costs then industry profits 
are improved relative to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.  
Conditions (i) and (ii) can be expressed as: 
   mcqmrniQQ iiTTTT >∈∃⇒> )(:,...,1)()( *0* pipi    ( 23 ) 
   )()()(:,...,1 0** TTTTii QQmcqmrni pipi >⇒>∈∃    ( 24 ) 
respectively, where the superscript “*” represents market outcomes under collusion, and the 
superscript “0” Cournot equilibria. 
(i) Proof by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose there is a sustainable equilibrium 
(identified with the superscript ”e”) where industry profits are above the non-cooperative 
Cournot equilibrium and marginal revenues are smaller than or equal to marginal costs for all 
firms in the industry, i.e.: 
   nimcqmrQQ eiiTTeTT ,...,1,)()()( 0 ∈∀≤∧> pipi   ( 25 ) 
from (25) and (8) it follows that 
     )()( 00 TeTTeT QpQpQQ >∧<     ( 26 ) 
thus, from Assumption 1(ii) it can be shown that 
   )()´()()´()( 00 TeiTeTeieTeii QpqQpQpqQpqmr +⋅>+⋅=    ( 27 ) 
It suffices to show that there is one case where (25) is violated. Thus, consider the case of a 
symmetric equilibrium where 
     
n
Qq
n
Qq Ti
e
Te
i
0
0
=∧=      ( 28 ) 
it follows that 
     mcmrqmr ieii => 0)(      ( 29 ) 
 
which contradicts our initial hypothesis. 
Q.E.D. 
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(ii) I show (24) through reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that (24) is not true and: 
   )()()(:,...,1 0** TTTTii QQmcqmrni pipi ≤∧>∈∃   ( 30 ) 
Note that industry profits in the Cournot Nash equilibrium are given by 
     ∑
=
=
n
i
o
iiTT qQ
1
0 )()( pipi       ( 31 ) 
where total industry output can be rewritten as the sum of the firm own output plus the output 
of all other firms in the industry 
     
o
iiT QqQ −+= 00       ( 32 ) 
and 
    mcQqQpQpQ iiTTTT −+⋅+= −− )()´()()( 00000´pi    ( 33 ) 
where )( oii qpi  is firm i’s profit at the non-cooperative equilibrium characterized by (4) for all 
firms in the industry, and )( oTT Qpi  are the industry non-cooperative Cournot equilibrium 
profits. From (4) I know that 0)( 0´ =ii qpi  . It then follows that: 
   0)´()´()()( 00000´0´ <⋅=⋅+=
−− iTiTiiTT QQpQQpqQ pipi    ( 34 ) 
since 0)´( 0 <TQp and 00 >−iQ . Then, from (8) and (30) it can be shown that 
   )()()()( 0*0*0* TTTTTT QpQpQQQQ <⇒>⇒< pipi    ( 35 ) 
since 0* TT QQ >  then there must exist at least one firm, say firm i, that produces at least as 
much as under Cournot equilibrium, i.e.,  
     
0*:,...,1 ii qqni ≥∈∃       ( 36 ) 
Then, from Assumption 1(i), (35), and (36) it follows that the marginal revenue for firm i 
   
0*0**** )´()()´()()( iTTiTTi qQpQpqQpQpqmr ⋅+<⋅+=    ( 37 ) 
since demand is weakly concave (Assumption 1(ii)), it follows that 
     )´()´( 0* TT QpQp <      ( 38 ) 
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From (37) and (38) it immediately follows that 
     mcqmrqmr iii =< )()( 0*     ( 39 ) 
contradicting our initial hypothesis (30). 
Q.E.D. 
 
COROLLARY 2. The maximization of industry profits (perfect collusion) implies that firm 
marginal revenues are larger than marginal costs for all firms in the industry, i.e., that each 
and every firm in the industry colludes. 
Proof. I want to show that: (i) the maximization of industry profits (perfect collusion) implies 
that firm marginal revenues are larger than marginal costs for all firms in the industry.  
Perfect collusion is akin to a situation where the industry oligopoly conduct achieves a 
performance identical to that obtained if the industry were a monopoly. Condition (i) can be 
expressed as: 
    nimcqmrQ iiTT ,..,1)(0)( **´ ∈∀>⇒=pi    ( 40 ) 
where the superscript “*” represents market outcomes under collusion, and the superscript “0” 
the Cournot equilibrium. Expression (40) can be rewritten as: 
     mcQQpQp TTT =⋅+ *** )´()(     ( 41 ) 
or 
     mcMCMR TT ==*      ( 42 ) 
where  
     ∑
=
=
n
i
iT qQ
1
**
       ( 43 ) 
is the industry optimal output under (perfect) collusion, *iq  is the cartel output allocation to 
firm i, and TT MCMR ,*  are the industry marginal revenues and costs, respectively. That is, 
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under perfect collusion a cartel behaves as if it were a monopoly. From (41) and (42) it 
follows that 
   
****** )´()()´()( TTTiTT QQpQpqQpQp ⋅+>⋅+     ( 44 ) 
since demand is downward sloping (Assumption 1(i)) and ** Ti Qq < . This expression can be 
rewritten as 
     
** )( Tii MRqmr >      ( 45 ) 
where )( *ii qmr designates firm i’s marginal revenues with Cournot conjectures at *iq .  
From (45), (42), and (4) it follows that 
     nimrmcqmr iii ,...,1,)( 0* ∈∀=>    ( 46 ) 
Q.E.D. 
Expression (46) indicates that the collusive profit maximization condition negates 
profit maximization at the firm level, a well known result which Tirole (1988) ascribes to the 
negative externality between firms: when firms maximize individual profits they take into 
account the effect of its output change on market price and its own revenues but do not 
consider the effect on total industry revenues.  
Thus, perfect collusion implies that each firm participating in the collusive agreement 
has (non-cooperative) individual marginal revenues that are larger than the industry marginal 
revenues under collusion and than the firm marginal costs, i.e., each firm has an incentive to 
deviate from collusive outcome and to increase output in order to increase profits. In 
essence, collusion is akin to have each firm in the colluding coalition act as if it had higher 
marginal costs. Tirole (1988) shows that increases in a firm marginal costs lead the firm to 
produce less and result in a shift outwards of the residual demand faced by all other firms in 
the industry. If every firm in the collusion coalition chooses a lower output level in a 
coordinated manner, the residual demand of each firm shifts outward sufficiently so that as a 
result each firm has a higher profitability than under the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
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THEOREM 3. Collusion occurs if and only if the firm marginal revenue is larger than marginal 
cost for a sufficiently large subset of the firms in the industry.  
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1, Axiom 1, Theorem 1, and Theorem 2.  
 
4. Collusion test 
In Section 3, I showed that if and only if industry profits are larger than Cournot Nash 
equilibrium profits, then there is collusion (Theorem 1). Alternatively, if and only if the firm 
colludes, then its marginal revenues with Cournot Nash conjectures are larger than its 
marginal costs (Theorem 3).  
The test can thus be specified as one-tailed hypothesis test either based on Theorem 
1: 
 
0:
0:0
0
,,
0
,,
>Π−Π
≤Π−Π
tTtT
tTtT
HA
H
        ( 47 ) 
or alternatively based on Theorem 3: 
 
0:
0:0
,,
,,
>−
≤−
titi
titi
mcmrHA
mcmrH
        ( 48 ) 
where 0
,,
, tTtT ΠΠ are actual total industry profits and hypothetical total industry Cournot Nash 
equilibrium profits in period t, respectively, and titi mcmr ,, , are firm i’s marginal revenues (with 
Nash conjectures) and marginal costs in period t, respectively. 
In both specifications, rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the hypothesis of 
non-collusive behavior should be rejected. The first specification allows the rejection of non-
collusive behavior at the industry level, for example, using industry level time series data. The 
second specification allows the rejection of non-collusive behavior at the firm level, for 
example, using firm level time series data. Note that the purpose of the test is to quickly flag 
instances of suspected collusion for further investigation by authorities, which would then 
determine whether it is tacit or explicit collusion. The test does not, by itself, constitute 
evidence of explicit collusion. 
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5. Open issues 
The discussion in this section identifies open issues for further research, and 
discusses possible approaches to implementing the proposed collusion tests.  
 
5.1. Tacit versus explicit collusion 
Consider the collusion test specification given by (48). If the null hypothesis of no 
collusion is rejected with a greater degree of statistical significance, it is likely that for the 
observations of the sample, firm marginal revenue is much larger than its marginal cost, i.e., 
the observations underlying the empirical results likely fall on right tail of the distribution. For 
those observations, if the firm marginal revenue is much larger than its marginal cost, then 
the incentive to secretly violate the collusive agreement is large. Tacit collusion is more 
difficult to maintain if the incentive to violate the agreement is large. Thus, when the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the one percent level, we are likely to find a much smaller proportion 
of tacit collusion cases, than when the null hypothesis is rejected at the five or ten percent 
level.  
Likewise, if marginal revenue is only slightly larger than marginal cost, then the gains 
from collusion are likely to be relatively small. On the one hand, for firms engaging in explicit 
collusion, profits from collusion must be larger than the expected costs of explicit collusion 
(see proof Lemma 1). On the other hand, better coordination is likely to allow explicit 
colluding coalitions to increase market power by more than feasible for tacit colluding 
coalitions, and thus in larger differences between each colluding firm marginal revenues and 
marginal costs. Thus, the proportion of explicit collusion cases, when marginal revenue is 
only slightly above marginal cost, is likely to be much smaller than that when marginal 
revenue is much larger than marginal costs. If indeed so, the proposed test would have 
attractive properties, as type I errors would likely be tacit collusion cases, which are not 
relevant for regulatory purposes.  
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5.2. Data issues 
The main issue is what variables can be more easily obtained by regulatory 
authorities in order to detect instances of collusion. The data required for the tests suggested 
by either Theorem 1 or 3 are difficult to obtain, more so than data on prices and marginal 
costs as used, for example, in the Hall (1988) analysis of price-cost margins for different US 
industries. For both tests, there is the issue of the definition of the relevant market, and data 
availability in the necessary detail, particularly for multi-product firms. 
A test based on comparison of industry profits with Cournot Nash equilibrium profits 
(Theorem 1) would face a number of challenges. First, there is a difference between 
economic and accounting profits. Second, there would be fewer observations and probably 
more missing observations, as the test would be based on a comparison of industry level 
data. Still, even if, for example, it is not possible to obtain data for small firms, Corollary 1 
indicates that the same test could be applied for any subset of the industry. Finally, the 
reference industry profits under Cournot Nash equilibrium, which would be used as basis of 
comparison, cannot be observed. A possible approach would be to use the fact that firm 
market shares, in a Cournot Nash equilibrium, provide information about each firm’s marginal 
costs.   
A test based on the comparison of marginal revenues and marginal costs also faces 
significant data challenges. Both variables are not directly observable. Nonetheless, prior 
literature has looked at price cost margins (Cowling and Waterson, 1976; Hall, 1988; Parker 
and Röller, 1997), and therefore different approaches have been proposed to measure 
marginal costs. Structural conduct performance paradigm empirical studies used accounting 
measures of marginal costs. One possible approach in this line, assuming the availability of 
product line accounting revenues, costs, and output levels, could be to derive average 
incremental marginal revenues and marginal costs from quarterly or yearly sales and cost 
data. An alternative approach, would be to follow methodologies of the New Empirical 
Industrial Organization literature (Hall, 1988; Bresnahan, 1989; Parker and Röller, 1997) that 
attempt to estimate parameters of the firm’s supply response (Corts, 1999).  
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6. Conclusion 
It is well known that collusion outcomes are unnatural in that colluding firms act 
contrary to the economic incentives they face individually. Colluding firms have the incentive 
to secretly violate the collusive agreement and one of the main issues associated with the 
sustainability of collusion is to prevent such violations of the collusive agreement from 
occurring (Stigler, 1964).  
The proposed test of collusive conduct, based on the analysis of firm incentives, 
seeks to detect firm cooperative behavior not consistent with the perfect Nash equilibrium 
profit maximizing condition, a situation that occurs under both tacit and explicit collusion. It 
has several advantages. For one, measures of market performance, such firm and industry 
price-cost margins are not directly relevant to the test, thus it does not penalize efficient firms 
(Demsetz, 1973). Market structure and the degree of contestability of the market similarly do 
not affect the efficacy of the proposed test (Cabral, 2000; Baumol et al, 1982), since the test 
analyzes firm incentives for a given firm market structure, and firm conduct consistent with 
the contestable market hypothesis will result in the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
collusive behavior. Further, in the context of dynamic competition, the test may detect 
instances of tacit collusion where firms do not optimize profits for fear of retaliatory action by 
competitors. Finally, the test does not depend on the estimation of a conduct parameter that 
in effect measures how the industry conduct is correlated to that of industries under 
competitive or monopoly equilibria (and to price-cost margins). The test simply measures 
whether the firm has an incentive to deviate from its current output decision.  
The paper raises interesting questions that will hopefully be subject of further 
research. These include, among others, the analysis of the Bertrand dual case and the 
consideration of product differentiation.  
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